Spillovers without Social Interactions in Urban Sanitation

Joshua Deutschmann, Molly Lipscomb, Laura Schechter and Jessica Zhu

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 482-515

Abstract: We run a randomized controlled trial coupled with lab-in-the-field social network experiments in urban Dakar. Decision spillovers and health externalities play a large role in determining uptake of sanitation technology, with decision spillovers being largest among households that don't receive significant subsidies. There is no evidence that the spillovers are explained by social forces in general, nor by specific social mechanisms such as learning from others, social pressure, or reciprocity. We do find evidence of a fourth, nonsocial, mechanism impacting decisions: increasing health benefits. As more neighbors adopt the sanitary technology, it becomes more worthwhile for other households to adopt as well.

JEL-codes: I12 O12 O13 O18 Q53 Q55 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/app.20220047 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E181101V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/app.20220047.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/app.20220047.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:482-515

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/app.20220047

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics is currently edited by Alexandre Mas

More articles in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().