Disclosure by Politicians

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2010, vol. 2, issue 2, 179-209

Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by members of Parliament in 175 countries. Although two-thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than one-third make disclosures available to the public, and less than one-sixth of potentially useful information is publicly available in practice, on average. Countries that are richer, more democratic, and have free press have more disclosure. Public disclosure, but not internal disclosure to parliament, is positively related to government quality, including lower corruption. (JEL J13, I21, I12)

JEL-codes: I12 I21 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.2.2.179
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2010)
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2009)
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2009)
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