Disclosure by Politicians

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Published in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33077931/w14703.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Disclosure by Politicians (2010)
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2009)
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:33077931

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