Government Transfers and Political Support

Marco Manacorda (), Edward Miguel and Andrea Vigorito

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 3, 1-28

Abstract: This paper estimates the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pretreatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 13 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. Our results are consistent with theories of rational but poorly informed voters who use policy to infer politicians' redistributive preferences or competence, as well as with behavioral economics explanations grounded in reciprocity. (JEL D72, H23, H53, I38, O15, O17)

JEL-codes: D72 H23 H53 I38 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (151)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009)
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009)
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009)
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009)
Working Paper: Government transfers and political support (2009)
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009)
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