Government Transfers and Political Support
Marco Manacorda (),
Edward Miguel and
Andrea Vigorito
No 14702, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 14 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. A calibration exercise indicates that these persistent impacts are consistent with a model of rational but poorly informed voters learning about politicians' redistributive preferences.
JEL-codes: D72 H53 O12 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-lam, nep-ltv and nep-pol
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)
Published as Marco Manacorda & Edward Miguel & Andrea Vigorito, 2011. "Government Transfers and Political Support," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 1-28, July.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Government Transfers and Political Support (2011) 
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009) 
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009) 
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009) 
Working Paper: Government Transfers and Political Support (2009) 
Working Paper: Government transfers and political support (2009) 
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