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Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

Luc Behaghel, Bruno Crépon and Thomas Le Barbanchon

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 3, 1-27

Abstract: We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)

JEL-codes: J15 J68 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20140185
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Unintended Effects of Anonymous (2015)
Working Paper: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes (2014) Downloads
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