Unintended Effects of Anonymous

Luc Behaghel, Bruno Crépon and Thomas Le Barbanchon
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Bruno Crépon: CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.

Keywords: Non-labor; Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2015, 7 (3), pp.1-27. ⟨10.1257/app.20140185⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés (2015)
Working Paper: Unintended Effects of Anonymous (2015)
Working Paper: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes (2014)
Working Paper: Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01203070

DOI: 10.1257/app.20140185

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