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Can Social Information Affect What Job You Choose and Keep?

Lucas Coffman, Clayton R. Featherstone and Judd B. Kessler

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2017, vol. 9, issue 1, 96-117

Abstract: We show that the provision of social information influences a high-stakes decision and this influence persists over time. In a field experiment involving thousands of admits to Teach For America, those told about the previous year's matriculation rate are more likely to accept a teaching job, complete training, start, and return a second year. To show robustness, we develop a simple theory that identifies subgroups where we expect larger treatment effects and find our effect is larger in those subgroups. That social information can have a powerful, persistent effect on high-stakes behavior broadens its relevance for policy and theory.

JEL-codes: D83 I21 J22 J45 L31 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20140468
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American Economic Journal: Applied Economics is currently edited by Alexandre Mas

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:96-117