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Competition in Treasury Auctions

Helmut Elsinger (), Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and Christine Zulehner ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 1, 157-84

Abstract: We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.

JEL-codes: D44 E63 G21 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition in treasury auctions (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2015) Downloads
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:1:p:157-84