Competition in Treasury Auctions
Helmut Elsinger (),
Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and
Christine Zulehner ()
No 512, WIFO Working Papers from WIFO
Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. As the results show, increased competition reduces bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
Keywords: auction format; bidder surplus; competition; independent private values; multi-unit auctions; treasury auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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https://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/pubid/58731 Abstract (text/html)
Journal Article: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2019)
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2016)
Working Paper: Competition in treasury auctions (2016)
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2016:i:512
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