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Competition in Treasury Auctions

Helmut Elsinger (), Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and Christine Zulehner ()

No 512, WIFO Working Papers from WIFO

Abstract: Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. As the results show, increased competition reduces bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.

Keywords: auction format; bidder surplus; competition; independent private values; multi-unit auctions; treasury auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2016-03-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition in treasury auctions (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition in Treasury Auctions (2015) Downloads
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