Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Ginger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca and Daniel Martin

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 2, 141-73

Abstract: This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.

JEL-codes: C70 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180217 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E118203V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180217.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180217.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:2:p:141-73

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180217

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().