Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Ginger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca and Daniel Martin

No 21099, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple two-person disclosure game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold less favorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but receiver actions and beliefs suggest they are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.

JEL-codes: C9 D8 K2 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-exp
Note: IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published as Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2021. "Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 141-173, May.

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Journal Article: Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure (2021)
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