Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Antoine Billot and Xiangyu Qu

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, vol. 13, issue 3, 112-23

Abstract: The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann and the Savage framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.

JEL-codes: D11 D71 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs * (2020)
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs * (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180344

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