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Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs *

Antoine Billot () and Xiangyu Qu

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann (Theorems 1) and the Savage (Theorems 2) framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.

Date: 2020
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Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, In press

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