Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs *
Antoine Billot () and
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann (Theorems 1) and the Savage (Theorems 2) framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.
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Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, In press
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Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs * (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-03034701
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