Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

Arno Apffelstaedt and Jana Freundt

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 4, 440-74

Abstract: Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes impacts economic behavior and sheds light on factors that may underlie "rule legitimacy."

JEL-codes: C90 D63 D72 D73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200038

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