Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance
Arno Apffelstaedt and
Jana Freundt ()
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Jana Freundt: Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania
No 18, PPE Working Papers from Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania
We study experimentally how people’s willingness to comply with elected rules is affected by voter manipulation and disenfranchisement. Groups of 100 subjects vote on a “code of conduct” regarding behavior in a dictator game. Introducing a voting fee, offering subjects money to change their votes, or excluding the votes of low-income subjects leads to a strong decline in voluntary compliance with elected rules that ask subjects to give. Rules that ask subjects to not give see no decline. Heterogeneity in behavioral reactions suggests that treatment effects are driven by preferences for democratic participation and by preferences for unbiased election procedures.
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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https://www.sas.upenn.edu/ppe-repec/ppc/wpaper/0018.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0018
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