Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types

Olivier Compte () and Philippe Jehiel ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009, vol. 1, issue 1, 182-206

Abstract: We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as long as private information is dispersed. We also illustrate how veto constraints differ from ex post participation constraints. (JEL C78, D82)

JEL-codes: C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.182
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types (2009)
Working Paper: Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types (2009)
Working Paper: Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types (2006)
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