Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
Olivier Compte and
Philippe Jehiel ()
Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics
Date: 2006-06-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types (2009) 
Working Paper: Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types (2009)
Working Paper: Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000085
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