Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

Lucas Coffman

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 4, 77-106

Abstract: This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)

JEL-codes: A13 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.4.77
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (106)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.4.77 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/data/2010-0151_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/app/2010-0151_app.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:4:p:77-106

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().