Strategic Immunization and Group Structure
Andrea Galeotti () and
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 2, 1-32
We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying difference, even a small amount of intergroup contact generates large asymmetries. (JEL D71, D85)
JEL-codes: D71 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.1
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Working Paper: Strategic immunization and group structure (2012)
Working Paper: Strategic Immunization and Group Structure (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:1-32
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