Strategic Immunization and Group Structure
Andrea Galeotti () and
No 1551, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex-ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying di erence, even a small amount of inter-group contacts generates large asymmetries. JEL Code: D61, H51, i14
Keywords: Diffusion; SIS; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic Immunization and Group Structure (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic immunization and group structure (2012)
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