Economics at your fingertips  

(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters

Heski Bar-Isaac () and Joyee Deb

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 4, 293-325

Abstract: We present a model in which an agent takes actions to affect her reputation with two audiences with diverse preferences. This contrasts with standard reputation models that consider a homogeneous audience. A new aspect that arises is that different audiences may observe outcomes commonly or separately. We show that, if all audiences commonly observe outcomes, reputation concerns are necessarily efficient- the agent's per-period payoff in the long run is higher than in one-shot play. However, when audiences separately observe different outcomes, the result is the opposite. Therefore, the agent would prefer to deal with audiences commonly. If this is not possible, the second-best solution may be to forgo reputation with one audience and focus entirely on the other.

JEL-codes: D11 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.293
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf) (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

Page updated 2022-05-13
Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:293-325