Expanding "Choice" in School Choice

Atila Abdulkadiro?lu, Yeon-Koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-42

Abstract: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their preference intensities, which entails ex ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism that allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It inherits much of the desirable properties of DA but performs better in ex ante efficiency. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28)

JEL-codes: D82 H75 I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20120027
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Expanding “Choice” in School Choice (2010)
Working Paper: Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2010)
Working Paper: Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (2008)
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