Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-Koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda (yosuke.yasuda@gmail.com)

No 10-23, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.

Keywords: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm; choice-augmented deferred acceptance; tie breaking; ex ante Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (2015)
Working Paper: Expanding “Choice” in School Choice (2010)
Working Paper: Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:duk:dukeec:10-23

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