Patchwork Policies, Spillovers, and the Search for Oil and Gas

Eric Lewis

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2019, vol. 11, issue 1, 380-405

Abstract: The United States has a complex patchwork of mineral ownership, where rights to oil and gas may be owned by the federal government, state governments, or private agents. I show why the policies imposed by one owner have theoretically ambiguous spillover effects on the drilling and production outcomes of neighboring plots of land. Exploiting a natural experiment in Wyoming with exogenous ownership assignment, I find significant spillovers: federal land close to state land has a lower probability of drilling than federal land far from state land.

JEL-codes: H82 L71 P14 Q35 Q38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160373
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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