Do Kidney Exchanges Improve Patient Outcomes?

Keith Teltser

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2019, vol. 11, issue 3, 427-53

Abstract: In this paper, I estimate the number of additional transplants generated by kidney exchanges. To do this, I analyze substitution patterns between exchange transplants and other transplant outcomes. Exploiting variation in patients' exposure to exchange activity across time and place, I find that 64 percent of exchange transplants represent new living donor transplants. Using the same approach, I find that an increase in the probability of receiving an exchange transplant reduces the probability of graft failure and reduces time spent waiting for a kidney. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that each exchange transplant increases social welfare by $300,000 to $700,000.

JEL-codes: D47 I11 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170678
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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