Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts
Niels Johannesen,
Patrick Langetieg,
Daniel Reck,
Max Risch and
Joel Slemrod
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2020, vol. 12, issue 3, 312-46
Abstract:
In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2–$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
JEL-codes: H24 H26 K34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20180410 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E112222V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20180410.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20180410.ds (application/zip)
Related works:
Working Paper: Taxing hidden wealth: the consequences of U.S. enforcement initiatives on evasive foreign accounts (2020) 
Working Paper: Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts (2018) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:12:y:2020:i:3:p:312-46
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180410
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy is currently edited by Matthew Shapiro
More articles in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().