Technology, Taxation, and Corruption: Evidence from the Introduction of Electronic Tax Filing

Oyebola Okunogbe and Victor Pouliquen

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2022, vol. 14, issue 1, 341-72

Abstract: Many e-government initiatives introduce technology to improve efficiency and avoid potential human bias. Using experimental variation, we examine the impact of electronic tax filing (to replace in-person submission to tax officials) using data from Tajikistan firms. E-filing reduces the time firms spend on taxes by 40 percent. Further, among firms previously more likely to evade, e-filing doubles taxes paid. Conversely, evidence suggests that e-filing reduces tax payments among firms previously less likely to evade. These firms also pay fewer bribes, as e-filing reduces extortion opportunities. These patterns are consistent with differential treatment of firms by tax officials prior to e-filing.

JEL-codes: D22 H25 H26 O14 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200123

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