Health Care Rationing in Public Insurance Programs: Evidence from Medicaid
Timothy Layton,
Nicole Maestas,
Daniel Prinz () and
Boris Vabson
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2022, vol. 14, issue 4, 397-431
Abstract:
We study two mechanisms used by public health insurance programs for rationing health care: outsourcing to private managed care plans and quantity limits for prescription drugs. Leveraging a natural experiment in Texas's Medicaid program, we find that the shift to managed care and the relaxation of a strict drug cap increased access to high-value drugs and outpatient services and reduced avoidable hospitalizations. Program costs increased significantly, indicating a trade-off between cost and quality. We provide suggestive evidence attributing the reduction in hospitalizations to the relaxation of the drug cap and much of the spending increase to the shift to managed care.
JEL-codes: G22 H75 I13 I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190628
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