Hassle Costs versus Information: How Do Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Prescribing?

Abby Alpert, Sarah Dykstra and Mireille Jacobson

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2024, vol. 16, issue 1, 87-123

Abstract: We study hassle costs versus information provision in explaining how prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) decrease opioid prescribing. PDMPs aim to reduce opioid prescribing through information provision but may also unintentionally affect prescribing through the hassle of required record checks. We analyze Kentucky's landmark PDMP to disentangle these two mechanisms. Hassle costs reduce opioid prescribing across the board, including to opioid-naive patients; however, physicians continue to prescribe opioids to patients who would benefit the most. Although information also affects prescribing, hassle costs explain the majority of the decline. Introducing a cost to prescribing high-risk medications improves the targeting of treatment.

JEL-codes: H75 I11 I12 I18 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200579

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