Firm Donations and Political Rhetoric: Evidence from a National Ban
Julia Cagé,
Caroline Le Pennec and
Elisa Mougin
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 217-56
Abstract:
We study France's 1995 ban on firm donations to politicians. We use a difference-in-differences approach and a novel dataset combining the campaign manifestos issued by candidates running in French parliamentary elections with data on their campaign contributions. We show that banning firm donations discourages candidates from advertising their local presence during the campaign, as well as economic issues. The ban also leads candidates from nonmainstream parties to use more extreme language. This suggests that private donors shape politicians' topics of interest, and that campaign finance reforms may affect the information made available to voters through their impact on candidates' rhetoric.
JEL-codes: D22 D72 D83 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220218
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