Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention

Giuseppe Albanese, Guido de Blasio and Lorenzo Incoronato ()

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 451-80

Abstract: Government transfers might have long-lasting consequences on electoral outcomes. We study a regional policy implemented in Italy over the second half of the twentieth century and leverage variation in transfers to show that parties promoting more state intervention in the economy performed better in the targeted areas relative to places that were not subsidized, decades after the end of the policy. This effect does not seem to mirror long-term differences in the economic performance of treated and control areas, which were small, nor other attitudes within the electorate.

JEL-codes: D72 H76 I38 N34 N44 R53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20220452 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E192931V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20220452.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20220452.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:451-80

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220452

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy is currently edited by Matthew Shapiro

More articles in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().