Managers' Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector

Pablo Muñoz and Mounu Prem

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2024, vol. 16, issue 4, 223-53

Abstract: Governments face many constraints in attracting talented managers to the public sector, which often lacks high-powered incentives. In this paper, we study how a civil service reform in Chile changed the effectiveness of a vital group of public sector managers: school principals. First, we estimate principal effectiveness by using an extension of the canonical teacher value-added model. Then we evaluate the effect of the reform on principal effectiveness using a difference-in-differences approach. We find that public schools appointed more effective managers and improved their students' outcomes after increasing the competitiveness and transparency of their selection process.

JEL-codes: D73 H83 I21 J24 J45 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20220732 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E191751V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20220732.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20220732.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Managers' Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:16:y:2024:i:4:p:223-53

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220732

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy is currently edited by Matthew Shapiro

More articles in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().