My Taxes Are Too Darn High: Why Do Households Protest Their Taxes?

Brad Nathan, Ricardo Perez-Truglia and Alejandro Zentner

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2025, vol. 17, issue 1, 273-310

Abstract: In the United States and globally, taxpayers can file a protest to legally reduce their property taxes. While tax protests can provide a unique opportunity to study the (un)willingness to pay taxes, they have received little attention from researchers. Using a field experiment and a quasi-experiment, we study what motivates households to protest their property taxes. We find that both expected savings and filing frictions play significant roles. We estimate the magnitude of filing frictions using a money metric. We also discuss how low-cost interventions targeted at disadvantaged groups can mitigate existing disparities in the system of tax appeals.

JEL-codes: C93 D91 G51 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: My Taxes are Too Darn High: Why Do Households Protest their Taxes? (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220768

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