Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics

Ethan Kaplan, Jörg Spenkuch and Haishan Yuan

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2025, vol. 17, issue 3, 441-70

Abstract: We exploit the quasi-random timing of natural disasters to study the connection between public attention to politics and legislators' support for special interests. We show that when a disaster strikes, the news media reduce coverage of politics in general and of individual legislators in particular, and members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt special interest donors' positions. The evidence implies that politicians are more inclined to take actions benefiting special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggest that attention to politics improves electoral accountability even in an environment with stringent transparency requirements.

JEL-codes: D72 L82 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:441-70

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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230783

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