Sacred Cars? Cost-Effective Regulation of Stationary and Nonstationary Pollution Sources
Meredith Fowlie,
Christopher Knittel and
Catherine Wolfram
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2012, vol. 4, issue 1, 98-126
Abstract:
For political and practical reasons, environmental regulations sometimes treat point-source polluters, such as power plants, differently from mobile-source polluters, such as vehicles. This paper measures the extent of this regulatory asymmetry in the case of nitrogen oxides (NO x ), the most recalcitrant criteria air pollutant in the United States. We find significant differences in marginal abatement costs across source types: the marginal cost of reducing NO x from cars is less than half the marginal cost of reducing NO x from power plants. Our results measure the possible efficiency gains and distributional implications associated with increasing the sectoral scope of environmental regulations.(JEL Q53, Q58, R41)
JEL-codes: Q53 Q58 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.4.1.98
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
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