Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures

Toke Aidt and Julia Shvets

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2012, vol. 4, issue 3, 1-29

Abstract: We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less pork to their district when they cannot seek re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this last term reduction in funding is smaller in states with many legislative districts. (JEL D72, H70)

JEL-codes: D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.4.3.1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures (2011)
Working Paper: Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures (2011)
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