Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect

Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2013, vol. 5, issue 4, 230-69

Abstract: Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents?for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this "golden goose" effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter

JEL-codes: D73 D82 H83 J41 K42 O17 O21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.4.230
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (100)

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