Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments

Gergely Ujhelyi

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2014, vol. 6, issue 2, 338-80

Abstract: This paper studies the policy impact of civil service regulations, exploiting reforms undertaken by US state governments throughout the twentieth century. These reforms replaced political patronage with a civil service recruited based on merit and protected from politics. I find that state politicians respond to these changes by spending relatively less through the reformed state-level bureaucracies. Instead, they allocate more funds to lower level governments. The reallocation of expenditures leads to reduced long-term investment by state governments.

JEL-codes: D73 H72 H77 H79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.2.338
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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