Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety

Catherine Hausman

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2014, vol. 6, issue 3, 178-206

Abstract: Following electricity market restructuring, approximately half of all commercial US nuclear power reactors were sold by price-regulated public utilities to independent power producers. At the time of the sales, some policymakers raised concerns that these corporations would ignore safety. Others claimed that the sales would bring improved reactor management, with positive effects on safety. Using data on various safety measures and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find that safety improved following ownership transfers and the removal of price regulations. Generation increased, and this does not appear to have come at the cost of public safety.

JEL-codes: D24 L51 L94 L98 Q42 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.3.178
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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