The Impact of Regulation on Mortgage Risk: Evidence from India
John Campbell (),
Tarun Ramadorai () and
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2015, vol. 7, issue 4, 71-102
We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in India between 1995 and 2010 to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted mortgage lending and risk. Our paper uses changes in regulatory treatment discontinuities associated with loan size and leverage to detect regulation-induced loan delinquencies. We also find that an acceleration in the classification of assets as nonperforming resulted in substantially lower delinquency probabilities and losses given delinquency. (JEL D14, G21, G28, L51, O16, R31)
JEL-codes: D14 G21 G28 L51 O16 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130220
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:7:y:2015:i:4:p:71-102
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy is currently edited by Matthew Shapiro
More articles in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().