Mafia in the Ballot Box

Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo De Luca

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 134-67

Abstract: We study the impact of organized crime on electoral results, analyzing in detail the national parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946-1992. We document the significant support given by the Sicilian mafia to the Christian Democratic Party when the electoral competition by the Communist Party strengthened. We also provide suggestive evidence that, in exchange for its electoral support, the mafia obtained economic advantages in the construction sector.

JEL-codes: D72 K42 L74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150551
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mafia in the ballot box (2013)
Working Paper: Mafia in the ballot box (2013)
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