Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India

Rema Hanna and Shing-Yi Wang

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 262-90

Abstract: Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.

JEL-codes: C91 D12 D73 H83 K42 O12 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150029
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (128)

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