Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
Decio Coviello and
Stefano Gagliarducci ()
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 59-105
We study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement using a dataset on Italian municipal governments. To identify a causal relation, we first compare elections where the incumbent mayor barely won or barely lost another term. We then use the introduction of a two-term limit, which granted one potential extra term to mayors appointed before the reform. The main result is that an increase in tenure is associated with "worse" procurement outcomes. Our estimates are informative of the possibility that time in office progressively leads to collusion between government officials and local bidders.
JEL-codes: D72 H57 H76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150426
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 0kUVq3btuXLmsEm-qCFF (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... G5Nsli6xFpvlkF55OXvL (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: Tenure in Office and Public Procurement (2017)
Working Paper: Tenure in Office and Public Procurement (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:9:y:2017:i:3:p:59-105
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy is currently edited by Matthew Shapiro
More articles in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().