Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement

Chad Bown and Kara Reynolds

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017, vol. 9, issue 4, 64-100

Abstract: This paper examines implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, formal trade dispute negotiations are modeled as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policy's costs onto trading partners. The approach first extends the Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2011) model from trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations, and the resulting theory guides the empirical assessment on trade volume outcomes from WTO disputes over 1995-2009.

JEL-codes: D74 F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150145
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement (2015)
Working Paper: Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement (2015)
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