Can Financial Incentives to Firms Improve Apprenticeship Training? Experimental Evidence from Ghana

Gabriel Brown, Morgan Hardy, Isaac Mbiti, Jamie McCasland and Isabelle Salcher

American Economic Review: Insights, 2024, vol. 6, issue 1, 120-36

Abstract: We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices' rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices' participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits.

JEL-codes: D22 D82 J24 J31 M53 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220696

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