Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?

Dani Rodrik

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2018, vol. 108, 196-99

Abstract: I distinguish between political and economic populism. Both are averse to agencies of restraint, or, equivalently, delegation to technocrats or external rules. In the economic domain, delegation to independent agencies (domestic or foreign) occurs in two different contexts: (i) in order to prevent the majority from harming itself in the future and (ii) in order to cement a redistribution arising from a temporary political advantage for the longer-term. Economic policy restraints that arise in the first case are desirable; those that arise in the second case are much less so.

JEL-codes: D72 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181122
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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