Return-to-Work Policies and Labor Supply in Disability Insurance Programs

Arezou Zaresani

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2018, vol. 108, 272-76

Abstract: Return-to-work policies in disability insurance (DI) programs allow beneficiaries to collect a portion of their benefits while working. I investigate whether a large increase in incentives to work in a return-to-work policy could induce benefit recipients to increase their labor supply. I quantify the effects on earnings and labor force participation using a sharp discontinuity in the induced incentives to work at the month of the policy change in a DI program in Canada. Using administrative data, I document that large incentives to work could induce beneficiaries to increase their labor supply both in intensive and extensive margins.

JEL-codes: G22 H55 J13 J14 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181047
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181047 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... GJuCYxSaKE_Cbs9XXi_r (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... gF-8ZeVr1txwBUqtKJ4R (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:apandp:v:108:y:2018:p:272-76

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Access Statistics for this article

AEA Papers and Proceedings is currently edited by William Johnson and Kelly Markel

More articles in AEA Papers and Proceedings from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().