Ownership, Concentration, and Investment

German Gutierrez () and Thomas Philippon

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2018, vol. 108, 432-37

Abstract: The US business sector has underinvested relative to profits, funding costs, and Tobin's Q since the early 2000s. Building on prior work, we argue that decreasing competition, rising intangibles, and tightening governance explain, respectively, about one-half, one-third, and one-sixth of the investment gap. In particular, quasi-indexer ownership appears to lower investment, and this effect is stronger in noncompetitive industries.

JEL-codes: D22 D25 G31 G32 G34 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181010 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... jmU_sEysX632n1A-Nfma (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:apandp:v:108:y:2018:p:432-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Access Statistics for this article

AEA Papers and Proceedings is currently edited by William Johnson and Kelly Markel

More articles in AEA Papers and Proceedings from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().