Institutions and Emissions Trading in China

Valerie Jean Karplus

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2018, vol. 108, 468-72

Abstract: Variation in the extent of state control in industry may affect China's efforts to establish a national emissions trading system (ETS) capable of supporting the implementation of the country's CO2 intensity reduction goals through 2030. This paper examines interactions between state control and an ETS, and identifies a tension in its design in China: state-controlled firms most likely to comply with the system may operate in the least market-oriented settings. Establishing a comprehensive and cost-effective ETS may require addressing potential barriers to participation and compliance in the domestic private sector, while increasingly exposing state-controlled firms to market forces.

JEL-codes: O13 O14 P28 P31 P37 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181030
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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